Dependency relationships within the cell cycle allow cells to arrest the cycle reversibly in response to agents or conditions that interfere with specific aspects of its normal progression. In addition, overlapping pathways exist which also arrest the cell cycle in response to DNA damage. Collectively, these control mechanisms have become known as checkpoints. Analysis of checkpoints is facilitated by the fact that dependency relationships within the cell cycle, such as the dependency of mitosis on the completion of DNA synthesis, and (...) the DNA damage checkpoint can be separated genetically. In fission yeast, Schizosaccharomyces pombe, the dependency of mitosis on prior completion of DNA synthesis is mediated through tyrosine‐15 phosphorylation of the ubiquitous mitotic regulator p34cdc2. In contrast, the arrest of mitosis caused by DNA damage acts through a separate mechanism that appears to be independent of tyrosine‐15 phosphorylation. Despite these distinct interactions with the mitotic machinery, the majority of fission yeast mutants that are deficient in mitotic arrest after DNA damage are also unable to respond to inhibition of DNA synthesis. In this essay we survey the current knowledge concerning feedback controls and checkpoints within fission yeast and relate this to information derived from other systems. (shrink)

Our view of heredity can potentially be distorted by the ease of introducing heritable changes in the replicating gene sequences but not in the cycling assembly of regulators around gene sequences. Here, key experiments that have informed the understanding of heredity are reinterpreted to highlight this distortion and the possible variety of heritable changes are considered. Unlike heritable genetic changes, which are always associated with mutations in gene sequence, heritable epigenetic changes can be associated with physical or chemical changes in (...) molecules or only changes in the system. The transmission of cycling stores along the continuous lineage of cells that connects successive generations creates waves of activity and localization of the molecules that together form the cell code for development in each generation. As a result, heritable epigenetic changes can include any that can alter a wave such as changes in form, midline, frequency, amplitude, or phase. Testing this integrated view of all heritable information will require the concerted application of multiple experimental approaches across generations. (shrink)

Life is perpetuated through a single-cell bottleneck between generations in many organisms. Here, I highlight that this cell holds information in two distinct stores: in the linear DNA sequence that is replicated during cell divisions, and in the three-dimensional arrangement of molecules that can change during development but is recreated at the start of each generation. These two interdependent stores of information – one replicating with each cell division and the other cycling with a period of one generation – coevolve (...) while perpetuating an organism. Unlike the genome sequence, the arrangement of molecules, including DNA, RNAs, proteins, sugars, lipids, etc., is not well understood. Because this arrangement and the genome sequence are transmitted together from one generation to the next, analysis of both is necessary to understand evolution and origins of inherited diseases. Recent developments suggest that tools are in place to examine how all the information to build an organism is encoded within a single cell, and how this cell code is reproduced in every generation. Life relies on the information for making organisms that is encoded in single cells and transmitted between generations. These cell codes include interdependent stores of information that replicate and that cycle. Understanding evolution and the origins of inherited diseases requires analysis of cell codes. (shrink)

Jennifer Saul has argued recently that the demonstrated intrusion of implicit bias into reasoning tasks gives rise to a particularly pernicious form of skepticism—one that challenges not only our knowledge claims, but also our epistemic self-conceptions. I argue that the proper response to Saulish skepticism is to take a naturalistic view of knowledge and the mind. Doing so reveals, ironically, that bias is not always bad: it plays an essential and constructive role in the development of human knowledge. Understanding the (...) salutary role biases play in human cognition affords us better tools for identifying the conditions under which pernicious biases form and operate. These conditions typically involve the exercise of healthy cognitive habits in the context of environments shaped by injustice. (shrink)

This volume brings together sixteen essays by Louise Antony that reflect her distinctive approach to issues at the intersections of feminist theory, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Antony proceeds from the Quinean precept that we treat knowledge as a natural phenomenon. This approach, Antony argues, offers feminists and other progressive theorists vital tools with which to expose and dismantle ideological conceptions of knowledge, human nature, and objectivity. She argues that naturalism's focus on the actual (...) (as opposed to hypothetical) circumstances under which human beings acquire knowledge illuminates and responds to feminist calls for a "situated" account of human knowledge. At the same time, Antony defends a number of views that have been the object of feminist criticism: psychological individualism, cognitive nativism, and the autonomy of semantics. These views, Antony argues, are in no way incompatible with feminist commitments, which is good, because they enjoy broad empirical support. Also in this volume, Antony addresses a number of practical issues of concern to feminists: Does pornography silence women? Are we ethically entitled to moral partiality? Is legitimate authority possible? Why are there so few women in philosophy? Finally, Antony presents and develops her own theory of gender. She argues that genders are socially constructed and multiply realized categories that bring into concordance sets of properties that have no natural or rational connection to each other. Genders must not be identified with the categories "female" and "male," but human sexual difference is the material, explanatory basis of gender systems: but for the existence of differences in reproductive role between females and males, gender regimes would not exist. (shrink)

In ”Embodiment and Epistemology,” Louise Antony considers a kind of ”Cartesian epistemology” according to which, so far as knowing goes, knowers could be completely disembodied, that is, pure Cartesian egos. Antony examines a number of recent challenges to Cartesian epistemology, particularly challenges from feminist epistemology. She contends that we might have good reason to think that theorizing about knowledge can be influenced by features of our embodiment, even if we lack reason to suppose that knowing itself varies relative (...) to such features. She also argues that a masculinist bias can result in mishandling of cognitive differences in cases where they actually exist and she examines a number of the ways in which the maleness of philosophy has, according to feminists, distorted epistemology. Even if a Cartesian approach offers one indispensable part of a comprehensive epistemology, according to Antony, we still need an epistemology that answers questions raised by our everyday, embodied lives. (shrink)

In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers -- William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan -- address a variety of conceptual issues raised in Noam Chomsky's work. Distinguished list of critics: William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan. Includes Chomsky's substantial new replies and responses to each essay. The best critical (...) introduction to Chomsky's thought as a whole. (shrink)

It is argued that current neuroimaging studies can provide useful constraints for the construction of models of cognition, and that these studies should be guided by cognitive models. A numberof challenges for a successful cross-fertilization between “mind mappers” and cognitive modelers are discussed in the light of current research on word recognition.

In this revealing volume, nineteen leading philosophers open a window on the inner life of atheism, shattering common stereotypes as they reveal how they came to turn away from religious belief. These highly engaging personal essays capture the marvellous diversity to be found among atheists, providing a portrait that will surprise most readers. Many of the authors express great affection for particular religious traditions, even as they explain why they cannot embrace them. Philosophers Without Gods demonstrates convincingly, with arguments that (...) date back to Plato, that morality is independent of the existence of God. Collectively, these essays highlight the richness of atheistic belief – not only as a valid alternative to religion, but as a profoundly fulfilling and moral way of life. (shrink)

I analyze and criticize Naomi Scheman's argument for the claim that psychological individualism-the thesis that psychological states are entities or particulars over which psychological theories may quantify-has no legitimate philosophical backing and is instead an element of patriarchal ideology. I conclude that Scheman's argument is flawed and that her thesis is false. Psychological individualism is perfectly compatible with and may even be required by feminist political theory.

This chapter discusses central problems and prospects for ethical naturalism. Section 1 explains what is meant by “ethical naturalism” and surveys different versions of the view. Section 2 discusses the central philosophical challenge to ethical naturalism, viz., the “Normativity Objection.” Section 3 offers a battery of responses to it on behalf of the ethical naturalist. Section 4 explores a promising and novel approach to ethical naturalism, viz., a moral nativist theory that that combines a Chomskian approach to moral competence with (...) a structuralist metaphysics. (shrink)

The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.

tad aikṣata, bahu syām prajāyeyetiIt thought, May I be many, may I grow forth.rūpaṁrūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva tadasya rūpam praticakṣanāyaThe prototype has assumed various forms, and such is its form as that which it adopts for its manifestation.prathamaṁ śūnyatābodhiṁ dvitīyaṁ bījasaṁgrahṁ tṛtīyaṁ bimba niṣpattiṁ caturthannyāsamakṣaraṁFirst is the void; second the seed; third the emanation of the image; fourth the articulation of the syllable.… rest and play alternate in the divine perfection as they must. … Ātman-Brahman must also be conceived not as (...) resting but playing in and as the thought.The aim of this article is to meditate philosophically on the very nature and significance of the trinitarian conceptions of.. (shrink)

The old problem about mental causation arises out of dualism: if minds are not physical, how can they interact causally with bodies? The new problem about mental causation arises, ironically, out of materialism: if everything that happens, including intentional action, has a wholly physical cause, what room is left for distinctively mental causes? This is the problem to which the essays in Heil and Mele’s extremely useful volume are devoted. Although mental causation enthusiasts will recognize most of the arguments and (...) positions put forward in these papers, the collection is invaluable as a kind of canon, since the contributors include many of the most important parties to the debate, and collectively present nearly the full range of opinion on this topic. (shrink)

I understand feminist epistemology to be epistemology put at the service of feminist politics. That is, a feminist epistemology is dedicated to answering the many questions about knowledge that arise in the course of feminist efforts to understand and transform patriarchal structures, questions such as: Why have so many intellectual traditions denigrated the cognitive capacities of women? Are there gender differences in epistemic capacities or strategies, and what would be the implications for epistemology if there were? I argue here that (...) such questions situate feminist epistemology much more in mainstream epistemological discussion than probably most feminists would admit, finding that, at least for issues in these areas, the naturalistic approach to the study of knowledge advocated by W. V. Quine has been extremely useful. (shrink)

_In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers -- William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan -- address a variety of conceptual issues raised in Noam Chomsky's work._ Distinguished list of critics: William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan. Includes Chomsky's substantial new replies and responses to each essay. The best critical (...) introduction to Chomsky's thought as a whole. (shrink)

_In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers -- William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan -- address a variety of conceptual issues raised in Noam Chomsky's work._ Distinguished list of critics: William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan. Includes Chomsky's substantial new replies and responses to each essay. The best critical (...) introduction to Chomsky's thought as a whole. (shrink)

Protein splicing is an extraordinary post‐translational reaction that removes an intact central “spacer” domain (Sp) from precursor proteins (N‐Sp‐C) while splicing together the N‐ and C‐domains of the precursor, via a peptide bond, to produce a new protein (N‐C). All of the available data on protein splicing fit a model in which these intervening sequences excise at the protein level via a self‐splicing mechanism. Several proteins have recently been discovered that undergo protein splicing, and in two such cases, the excised (...) spacer protein is an endonuclease. Such endonucleases are capable of conferring genetic mobility upon the intervening sequences that encodes them. These intervening sequences define a new family of mobile genetic elements that are translated yet remain phenotypically silent by excising at the protein rather than the RNA level. (shrink)

Atheists are frequently demonized as arrogant intellectuals, antagonistic to religion, devoid of moral sentiments, advocates of an "anything goes" lifestyle. Now, in this revealing volume, nineteen leading philosophers open a window on the inner life of atheism, shattering these common stereotypes as they reveal how they came to turn away from religious belief. These highly engaging personal essays capture the marvelous diversity to be found among atheists, providing a portrait that will surprise most readers. Many of the authors, for example, (...) express great affection for particular religious traditions, even as they explain why they cannot, in good conscience, embrace them. None of the contributors dismiss religious belief as stupid or primitive, and several even express regret that they cannot, or can no longer, believe. Perhaps more important, in these reflective pieces, they offer fresh insight into some of the oldest and most difficult problems facing the human mind and spirit. For instance, if God is dead, is everything permitted? Philosophers without Gods demonstrates convincingly, with arguments that date back to Plato, that morality is independent of the existence of God. Indeed, every writer in this volume adamantly affirms the objectivity of right and wrong. Moreover, they contend that secular life can provide rewards as great and as rich as religious life. A naturalistic understanding of the human condition presents a set of challenges--to pursue our goals without illusions, to act morally without hope of reward--challenges that can impart a lasting value to finite and fragile human lives. Collectively, these essays highlight the richness of atheistic belief--not only as a valid alternative to religion, but as a profoundly fulfilling and moral way of life. (shrink)

The heated debate over whether there is only a single mechanism or two mechanisms for morphology has diverted valuable research energy away from the more critical questions about the neural computations involved in the comprehension and production of morphologically complex forms. Cognitive neuroscience data implicate many brain areas. All extant models, whether they rely on a connectionist network or espouse two mechanisms, are too underspecified to explain why more than a few brain areas differ in their activity during the processing (...) of regular and irregular forms. No one doubts that the brain treats regular and irregular words differently, but brain data indicate that a simplistic account will not do. It is time for us to search for the critical factors free from theoretical blinders. (shrink)

National climate risk frameworks catalogue threats but rarely define which risks are tolerable, to whom and how to decide. We propose embedding evaluative governance — the structures, processes and relationships that guide law, policy, deliberation, funding and evaluation — across the policy cycle to translate into accountable, equitable and adaptive climate action.